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Abstract 
 
In many developing countries, firms confront a highly adverse business environment.  
In these cases, development (in theory) ‘should not’ occur and observers tend to 
recommend government policy reform.  The World Bank ranks India 116th out of 155 
countries according to the ease of ‘doing business’.  Indian managers spend a great 
deal of their time dealing with government regulations and bureaucracy.  However, 
despite these difficulties there has been an explosion of technology-based 
entrepreneurship in India’s software and IT industries.  In theory, the Indian software 
industry ‘should not’ have developed in the way it did.  This paper shows how Indian 
software entrepreneurs overcame institutional barriers to development and how they 
themselves initiated institutional change, despite Government’s restrictive policies.  
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Indian software firms were able to circumvent 
government imposed restrictions to growth and lead institutional reform in India.  If 
India’s entrepreneurs can do it perhaps others can too.   
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Introduction 
In many countries of the world large scale, effective business development through 
entrepreneurial activity ‘should not occur’.  Research by de Soto (2000) and Djankov 
and McLiesh (2005) and others show that starting and running a business is extremely 
difficult in many developing countries.  Furthermore, Djankov and McLiesh (2005, 
p3) argue that reform of the business environment could have a positive impact on the 
growth of some of the poorest countries.  They contend that there is positive 
relationship between the ‘ease of doing business’ and the human development index. 
 
In India, the problem of an adverse business climate is especially acute.  India is 
ranked 116th (out of the 155 countries) in a ranking which shows how difficult it is to 
do business according to a series of criteria (Doing Business in 2006).  The country 
also ranks 130th in terms of difficulties in trading across borders and 138th for the ease 
in enforcing of contracts.  Indian senior management spent 12.9% of their time 
dealing with requirements of regulations compared with 6.4% average worldwide.  
Indian officials' interpretations of regulations are highly inconsistent and licensing 
laws in India have been notoriously difficult to navigate.   
 
The problems posed by an adverse business environment can go much deeper than the 
mere inconvenience and costs of delays caused by regulation.  As Krueger (1974) and 
Baumol (1990) argue, excessive government regulation and intervention often 
function as a means of rent extraction by particular groups in society.  For example, 
the granting of licences by government officials frequently leads to competition for 
large rents, encouraging bribery and diverting entrepreneurs into rent seeking and 
away from innovative activities.  In extreme cases, the perception that businesses 
become successful by exerting influence or bribing officials ‘to do what they ought in 
any event to do’ undermines both the link between pecuniary reward and business 
efficiency and trust in the motives and actions of government (Krueger, 1974, p302).  
Favouritism towards certain business groups can lead to the perception that 
government policy is a mechanism for rewarding the already rich and influential and 
erode values for doing business legally and ethically.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the many difficulties of an adverse business environment, in 
recent years we have seen an explosion of technology-based entrepreneurship in 
India’s software, information technology (IT) and business process outsourcing 
(BPO) industries.  But how can we explain this?  The kind of techno-entrepreneurship 
witnessed in India faces numerous institutional constraints, only some of which are 
imposed by or presided over by Government.  Serious constraints arise from 
underdeveloped financial markets, poor protection for property rights and weak 
contract enforcement.  These constraints should erode profitability, restrain market 
entry and impose high transactions costs on new entrepreneurial ventures, thereby 
stifling creativity and innovation.  In theory, the Indian software industry ‘should not’ 
have developed in the way it did.   
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This paper shows how the Indian software industry achieved its astonishing results 
despite the adverse conditions facing entrepreneurs.1  India provides vital lessons for 
other countries because it shows how, when given the economic opportunity, 
entrepreneurship can develop new world class business models, and start a 
demonstration effect for other industries to follow.  In turn, these changes can create 
the conditions for institutional transformation in the economy.   
 
Part 1 of the paper reveals how Indian software entrepreneurs overcame the huge 
institutional barriers to development and how they themselves initiated institutional 
change despite the Government’s restrictive policies.  Part 2 discusses some of the 
economic benefits achieved by the software entrepreneurs, relative to other kinds of 
firms, and their wider impact on other service sectors.  Part 3 concludes. 
 
 
PART 1: HOW INDIAN SOFTWARE FIRMS OVERCAME  OBSTACLES IN THE 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
 
1.1   Gaps in research on entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship studies can be traced back to the work of Richard Cantillon (circa 
1730) and Jean Baptiste Say (1816).2  Cantillion saw entrepreneurs as bearers of 
uncertainty, while Say (1816) saw the entrepreneur as the agent who united all means 
of production in order to make profits.  These ideas about what entrepreneurs did 
were re-discovered in the 20th century.  Thus, Frank Knight (1921) emphasised the 
entrepreneur's role in coping with the uncertainty of market dynamics, arguing that 
entrepreneurs were also required to perform fundamental managerial functions such 
as direction and control.  Harvey Leibenstein in the 1960s and 1970s saw the 
entrepreneur as the agent which resolved market deficiencies through input-
completing activities.  A somewhat different twist to the advantages of 
entrepreneurship was given by Joseph Schumpeter (1934) who saw the entrepreneur 
as a heroic innovator who implements change within markets through the carrying out 
of ‘new combinations’ of various kinds.  For Israel Kirzner (1979) the entrepreneur is 
the one who recognizes and acts upon market opportunities.  More recent 
contributions by Rothwell and Zegveld (1982) identified ‘intracorporate’ 
entrepreneurship (or intrapreneurship) in the modern context, showing how managers 
can create new businesses within large corporations. 
 
None of these writers explicitly examine entrepreneurship within the context of the 
developing countries or asked ask how the modern problems of development 
described by de Soto (2000) affect the ability of entrepreneurs to operate.  These 
include, as we noted earlier, the presence of underdeveloped financial markets, poor 
protection for property rights and weak contract enforcement.  Most entrepreneurship 
research today implicitly assumes that there is no difference between the 
                                                
1 Other papers focus on the globalisation of the Indian software sector (e.g. Desai, 2003; Arora and 
Gambardella, 2004; Athreye, 2005; Bannerjee and Duflo; 2000; and Basu, 2005).  Therefore, the focus 
of this paper is on how Indian firms managed to enter the industry despite their disadvantages. 
 
2  For an excellent summary of research on this subject see: 
http://www.westaction.org/definitions/def_entrepreneurship_1.html 
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entrepreneurship being carried out in the most developed nations and that carried out 
in ‘latecomer’ or developing countries.  Entrepreneurs in today’s developing countries 
are often called upon to perform highly specialised activities in an international 
division of labour.  These ‘latecomer’ entrepreneurial functions differ in many ways 
from the conventional advanced country (or ‘leadership’) entrepreneurship which 
focuses on developing new products and technologies (Hobday and Perini, 2005).  
1.2  How software firms coped with Indian institutions 
 
Software outsourcing from India grew through the 1980s and 1990s despite weak 
laws to enforce contracts, poor intellectual property (IP) protection, inadequate capital 
markets and a policy regime that was generally market-unfriendly.  Software services 
exports from India have grown from a mere $330 million in 1993 to $17.3 billion in 
2006, employing around 878,000 people.3  Estimates in Athreye (2005) suggest that in 
2001, entrepreneurial firms accounted for about 38% of sales revenues and 35% of 
employment in the Indian software outsourcing sector.  Six of the top twenty firms 
were entrepreneurial in origin.  The techno-entrepreneurship that sustained the growth 
of the Indian software industry is thus both intriguing and an inspiring for other 
countries that are poor, face adverse regulations and institutions.   
 
The simple answer to ‘how did this happen?’ is that the industry exploited its initial 
advantage in low-cost human capital.  As the newly emerging global IT industry 
boomed in the West, this led to a huge demand for trained engineers and technicians. 
Indian firms saw this economic opportunity and leveraged their cost advantage by 
occupying product market spaces and business models that avoided the penalties of 
their poor institutional environment and competition with incumbent firms.   
 
This occurred initially through the development of customised software designed for 
foreign MNCs within a business outsourcing relationship, in a manner very similar to 
the original equipment manufacture (OEM) arrangements of East Asian latecomer 
entrepreneurs in Korea and Taiwan (Hobday, 1995).  In the 1970s and 1980s the 
hurdles imposed by Government regulations and institutional difficulties meant it was 
far easier for Indian software firms to move teams of engineers abroad- a practice that 
is sometimes referred to as ‘body-shopping’.  In this way, the IP rights always 
belonged to the client firm and they could monitor the programmes directly.  
However, soon some firms gained reputations for timeliness and product quality and 
started attracting more work (Banerjee and Duflo, 2003).  They also began to be 
trusted to do the work in India where they could deliver the same quality of software 
at an even lower price.   
 
There were waves of experimentation with other kinds of business models, 
particularly the higher value-added software product model growth.  Firms such as 
Sonata, Mastek, and NIIT, in the mid 1980s, experimented with new value adding 
propositions - Sonata tried to develop software products for the domestic market and 
Mastek became the first company to use tools to speed up product development again 
for the domestic market.  NIIT experimented with combining training needs with 
software services and enjoyed much success.  However, the pioneering firms largely 
failed - due to the small domestic market and lax IP laws.  The lack of venture capital 
                                                
3 Estimates from the National Association of Software Services companies (NASSCOM). 
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support also made the higher value-adding product model a very risky one for 
entrepreneurial firms to adopt.   
 
The late-1980s saw a renewed exploration of the product market but this time aimed 
at foreign clients rather than domestic ones and carried out by larger firms who had 
deep pockets for such sustained investment.  Ramco (a business house subsidiary) and 
CITIL ( a spin-off from the multinational firm Citibank) began to produce products 
for foreign clients.  While CITIL’s product i-Flex became a huge success, Ramco’s 
product Marshall was overtaken by solutions by Western companies like SAP and 
other ERP product producers.  In interviews both firms emphasised the huge up-front 
investments needed and the important role for marketing capabilities in developing 
successful software products for overseas clients.   
 
Experimentation with new value added propositions continued in the 1990s, the most 
prominent of which was the application of the software services delivery model to 
administrative functions of companies (the so-called Business Process Outsourcing or 
Offshoring, BPO).  A more recent wave has focused on R&D outsourcing in the 
telecom domain.  
 
1.3 Institutional reform and adaptation 
 
The spectacular growth of the 1990s was also marked by an improvement in the 
institutional infrastructure surrounding the software outsourcing industry, which 
generally served to ease the constraints on the industry’s further growth.  These 
included capital and labour market reform, better access to finance, improved IP right 
protection and contract enforcement.   
 
Capital market institutions did not understand how to evaluate the finance needs of the 
emerging software industry.  Infosys, India’s most famous entrepreneurial firm, was 
refused a bank loan when it was being set up in 1981 and had to borrow the start-up money 
from the wife of one of the founders. It was probably not the only one. Faced with a 
situation where bank finance was not readily available and venture capital was not 
forthcoming, software firms were conservative in their own cash-flow calculations but 
experimented with importing the use of capital market institutions in the US.  Many 
software firms voluntarily listed on stock exchanges in the US and in Europe with more 
stringent disclosure norms in order to raise money for investments and acquisitions.  The 
compliance of some firms to international norms was a powerful force for improved 
corporate governance with the chairman of Infosys being involved in committees to 
promote these changes.  
 
The combined effects of liberalisation and the success of software industry drew US 
venture capital into India after 1993.  Dossani and Kenney (2002) show that a 
significant portion of the sevenfold increase in funds from 1993-1998 was accounted 
for by the entry of foreign investors after 1995, through investment arms of foreign 
banks, and venture firms that had raised capital abroad.  Indian Silicon Valley 
entrepreneurs encouraged new business plans within India and exploited the new exit 
routes made possible by the international listings of Indian software firms on 
NASDAQ, NYSE and the LSE.  According to recent estimates from the Indian 
Venture Capital Association, domestic and foreign venture capitalists invested $774 
million in 2003 in India up from $590 million in 2002 (Nair, 2004; Basu, 2005). 
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Training and the supply of human capital also improved.  As the software industry grew in 
the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, labour markets for software programmers became tight due to 
global market expansion and fierce competition.  In this period, scores of privately funded 
and organised educational and training institutions emerged to meet the demands for skilled 
labour, expanding supply beyond what could be produced through the state-funded 
educational establishments.  Desai (2003) shows that while engineering capacity increased 
six-fold from 61,000 in 1987-88 to 341,000, the supply of graduates with IT degrees saw a 
ten fold increase, from 25,000 in 1987-88 to 258,000 in 2002-03.  Privately financed 
training institutes such as NIIT and APTECH, sprung up to provide software training 
throughout the 1990s – a dramatic institutional departure in a country where reliance on 
publicly funded training institutions had been the norm.  As Table 3 shows their incidence 
increased all over India, especially post 1995.   
 
Table 1: Regionwise Break-up of Privately Financed IT Institutes in India 
 
Region 
Year 
East Central  North West South 
1987-88 12 25 5 80 66 
1995-96 13 42 26 80 76 
2002-03 84 76 82 86 92 
 
Source: Adapted from Arora and Gambardella (2004, Figures 2 & 3) based upon data from 
the All-India Council on Technical Education. 
 
Intriguingly, all of these changes occurred after the software growth opportunity had been 
spotted by entrepreneurs with some initial success.  India’s software firms did not wait for 
institutional reform.  On the contrary, software success caused the reform to take place.   
 
1.4 Creating Business Friendly Policies  
 
A very important driver for institutional reform was the National Association of 
Software Service Companies (NASSCOM), the largest and most important business 
association for software services and now BPO.  NASSCOM was set up in 1988, with 
just 38 members who collectively accounted for 65.0% of the industry revenues.  
Many of these members were small companies, and the total industry revenue in 1988 
was a little over $100 million.  By 2003-04, the number of members had risen to more 
than 800, collectively accounting for about 95% of the industry output of about $21 
billion.   
 
NASSCOM operates as a collective body representing the interests of the software 
sector with functions of lobbying, advocacy and public relations (Kapur, 2002).  
NASSCOM has been extremely effective in: lobbying for policies favourable to the 
industry’s continued growth; collective marketing at a time when Indian companies 
did not have an international reputation for delivering quality service; and providing 
information on the industry for insiders and outsiders.  Collective marketing involved 
organising trade fairs and producing directories of firms and their areas of business 
for potential customers, bringing together demand and the eager small entrepreneurial 
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firms4. The difficulties of ‘selling’ India software at the time cannot be overstated as a 
founder-member of NASSCOM told us: 
 
“When I was out there in 1991, the country was bankrupt.  We 
had three governments in one year, an assassination of a prime 
minister, and we were hawking our gold.  You know, selling 
overseas was not a piece of cake…. if I have to present ten 
slides, the first eight had to be to sell India and the ninth one 
would say we do have an IT industry in India and unless the 
guy bought those nine slides, your tenth one about your 
company was meaningless.  Because who are you anyway? So 
we had to building up the [Indian] brand from day one.” 
 
The attitude of NASSCOM towards engagement with the government on policy 
issues is a dramatic break with past practice.  Older industry associations, such as the 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), had a more hands-off approach to policy 
engagement.  NASSCOM engaged the Government with facts to ensure that business 
was given a free hand to take initiatives.  This approach has made for better industrial 
policy and improved corporate governance.  The NASSCOM lobbying model has 
been emulated in other fast-growing sectors, notably biotechnology and automotive 
components, which speaks volumes for its effectiveness. 
 
 
PART 2:  THE BENEFITS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
2.1 Economic benefits 
 
In many developing countries start up entrepreneurs fail to make much headway in 
terms of employment growth, new technology adoption and capital efficiency (Fehr 
and Nils-Henrik, 1995; Beck et al, 2003; Shadlen 2004).  To assess this issue, we 
compared some quantitative measures of the business performance of software 
entrepreneurial start up firms with those of business house subsidiaries and foreign 
MNCs (see Table 2).  Table 2 is based upon a survey of 204 software firms (132 
entrepreneurial firms, 27 business house subsidiaries, 45 foreign firms).  It shows that 
while the starting size  (indicated by the median number of employees after the first 
year of business ) for entrepreneurial firms was only marginally larger than that of 
domestic business house subsidiaries, both started smaller than foreign firms.  
Entrepreneurial firms grew to an employment size almost as large as foreign firms.  A 
similar picture emerges when we compare size by turnover.  Entrepreneurial firms 
showed a slower rate of growth than the subsidiaries of large domestic firms but grew 
at a marginally higher rate compared with foreign firms. 
 
Turning our attention to initial capital outlays we find that entrepreneurial firms 
started with very small initial capital outlays compared to both domestic firm 
subsidiaries and foreign firms, especially the former.  This may be related to the 
scarcity of finance that entrepreneurial firms face when they start-up due to the high 
                                                
4 Big business houses already had previous contacts and relationships with foreign vendors which they 
exploited. 
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cost of capital.  If we look at the ratio of the median turnover to median capital 
outlays as a crude input-output measure, we find that entrepreneurial firms are the 
most efficient in their use of capital.  This ratio is more than two and a half times that 
for foreign firms and over three and half times that for subsidiaries of domestic firms.  
In a capital-scarce economy, entrepreneurial firms appear to be doing a better job of 
conserving capital than non-entrepreneurial firms. 
 
 
Table 2: Economic Impact of Various Software Entrants, 2003  
 
New Start-
Ups 
 & Spin-Offs 
Subsidiaries 
of Domestic 
Firms 
Foreign 
Firms & 
MNE 
Subsidiaries 
 
 
 
All Firms 
Number of firms 132 27 40 204 
Employment     
Median annual rate of growth 
of employment (% per 
annum) 30 42 26 
 
29.7 
Median number of 
employees at the end of first 
year of operations 15 12 22.5 
 
 
18 
Median number of 
employees in 2003 80 148 90 
 
100 
Revenues     
Median annual revenue in 
2003 (in Rs. million) 80 268 100 
 
 
90 
Median (revenues/age) 11.43 43.67 12.5 12.86 
Equity     
Median equity (initial capital 
outlay in Rs. million) 3 37.5 10 
 
Ratio of median revenues to 
median start-up equity 26.67 7.15 10.00 
18.00 
 
Source: Firm origins survey. 
 
 
Thus, two surprising conclusions emerge from our survey: first, the employment 
growth of entrepreneurial firms was at least as good as that of MNCs; second, 
entrepreneurial firms are more efficient than both domestic and foreign firms in their 
utilisation of capital for the most productive use.  These findings should bring cheer to 
many capital-scarce economies. 
 
2.2 Business model benefits: the propensity to experiment 
 
Our survey also compares the motivations of entrepreneurial firms entering the 
software business with business house subsidiaries and multinational firms (see Table 
3).  While the pursuit of a profitable business opportunity was the overriding motive 
for all firms entering the software sector, the desire for independence and the 
possibility of technological innovation all figured highly in motivating entrepreneurial 
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entry.  By contrast, subsidiaries of domestic firms were more concerned with 
diversifying into more profitable areas and the desire to earn foreign exchange 
through exports.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Three most highly rated motivations for entering the software business 
Motivation 
Frequency of extreme 
scores 
Entrepreneurial firms ( N=132  )  
Identified new business opportunity 100 
Desire for independence 74 
Stimulated by research possibilities and the desire to 
innovate technologically 
70 
Business House subsidiaries(N=27)  
Diversification into a more profitable growth 
opportunity 
19 
Earn foreign exchange through exports 13 
Growing software needs of the parent company 11 
Foreign firms (N=40)  
High quality of programmers 35 
Lower cost of programmers 29 
English the international business language 25 
  
Source: Firm origins survey, 2003. 
 
Overall entrepreneurial firms had more creative space and were better placed to 
pursue their individual visions.  Entrepreneurial firms were also more likely to 
experiment with new business models.  
 
2.3 Impact of Software Entrepreneurship on Other Sectors 
 
Each of the institutional developments described in the previous sections have 
impacted other sectors where the outsourcing business model was adopted.  Capital 
market reforms, which began as part of a larger financial reform process, have 
gathered steam.  The successful use of international capital markets by Indian 
software firms and the simultaneous listing of software firms on both the Indian and 
foreign stock exchanges have resulted in a realignment of disclosure rules and 
corporate governance procedures in the Indian capital markets.5   
 
The emergence of third-party BPO activities in India led by firms such as EXL 
Services, 24/7, Spectramind, Daksh e-Services and Transworks, who all received 
venture capital funding for their seed capital, has impacted on manufacturing, health 
care, banking and financial services, pharmaceuticals, engineering, and textiles.  As a 
result there seems to be a gradual convergence in India towards the US model of 
venture capital institutions, initiated and aided by the diaspora of technology 
entrepreneurs in India and their Silicon Valley partners. 
                                                
5 N.R. Narayanamurthy, Chief Mentor of Infosys, has been an important member of many of the 
corporate governance committees set up for the reform of capital markets in India 
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The NASSCOM model of industry-government interaction has been adopted by new 
sectors relying on domestic entrepreneurship.  Examples include the Association of 
Biotechnology Led Enterprises (ABLE), which represents the biotechnology industry, 
and the older Automotive Component Manufacturers Association, established in 
1958.  The latter’s activities since 1994 resemble the NASSCOM model quite closely.  
Indeed, a visit to the web sites of these organisations shows that their strategies and 
information content are similar to that provided by NASSCOM.  This institutional 
reform has created more visibility about the desirability of more reforms and the part 
this process could play in supporting entrepreneurial growth in other services and 
knowledge based sectors 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Indian software firms were able to circumvent 
government-led restrictions to growth and then lead institutional reform in India.  
Moreover, these firms are bringing about major changes to the way business is being 
carried out in many other sectors, producing a wide ripple effect which will, 
hopefully, continue and grow in the future.  The impetus for institutional reform has 
not come from government, international institutions or their advisors, but from the 
business sector itself, reversing the way development analysts normally think about 
economic progress. 
 
In the software sector, start-up entrepreneurs played a leading role in creating and 
disseminating new business models and changing restrictive institutional practices.  
Indian software firms saw the burgeoning demand opportunity in the international 
market place and imported new institutional norms from the advanced nations, 
especially the US, bringing about improved capital inflows and enhanced intellectual 
property protection.  The new entrepreneurs not only helped reform local institutional 
but also began building new institutions and practices which are now diffusing to 
other industries.  Through their strategies, Indian start-up firms are changing the way 
business is done in India.   
 
This process of reform was made possible by first tapping into the huge boom in 
demand for IT services in the world economy and by exploiting the close connections 
built up by software entrepreneurs with foreign MNC buyers.  This both provided a 
direct channel into the growing international demand for software services and the 
new technologies which underpinned this demand.  Our survey evidence also shows 
that the new start up firms outperformed the advanced multinational corporations and 
the large local business house subsidiaries in terms of capital efficiency and were at 
least as effective in creating employment and developing the new skill base.   
 
This particular story has great relevance to other sectors in India and for other 
developing countries.  Entrepreneurs and their supporters need not wait for 
government to reform itself – they will wait a very long time for this.  Instead, they 
should reject any notion that ‘development is impossible’ because of government 
bureaucracy and difficulties of doing business.  Firms and business associations 
should be inspired by the Indian case to take the development lead, identify the 
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business opportunities ‘out there’ and circumvent any rules and restrictions which 
attempt to stop them.  Indian entrepreneurs can do it.  So can others. 
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